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Addendum A

On March

an order

hereto) was entered in the Third Judicial

District Court of Salt Lake County,
presiding, denying

21, 1989,

the Honorable

Scott Daniels

the Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment made

by the defendant John P. Pizzello ("Fizze!!©").

The defendant's

appeal is from the order entered March 21, 1989.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.
in denying

Whether the

the

trial court was within its discretion

defendant's

motion

to

set

aside

the default

judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.
2.

Whether the

trial court was within its discretion

in concluding that there had been valid service of process on the
defendant.
3.

Whether the

trial court was within its discretion

in concluding that the defendant had not shown

excusable neglect

in failing to respond to the Amended Complaint in this action.
4.

Whether due

of meritorious defense
default

as

judgment, where

process prohibits requiring a showing
a

prerequisite

valid

service

obtained, and if not, whether the
meritorious defense.

to
of

setting

process

defendant has

aside a
has

been

clearly shown a

(For reasons stated in Point IV, infra, the

plaintiff contends that this issue need not be reached.)

1

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/ copy attached as
Addendum B.
Rule 60f Utah Rules

of Civil

Procedure, copy attached

as Addendum C.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the
Court Below.
The plaintiffs
of

the

nature

of

the

agree with

the defendant's description

case, the course of proceedings and the

disposition in the Court below.
Statement of Facts.
The plaintiffs
addition

to

those

submit

stated

that

by

the

the

following

facts, in

defendant, are relevant and

material to this appeal:
1.

In addition to attesting as described in 117 of the

brief of the defendant and in the Affidavit of Service filed with
the original Summons (R.

36-37 incl.

back; Addendum

D hereto),

the plaintiffs' process server, David T. Holland, attested in his
sworn affidavit filed February

2,

1989

(R.

68-72;

Addendum E

hereto) as follows concerning his service of the defendant:
(a)
apartment

As Mr.

identified

Holland first
as

approached the

Pizzello's,

the

door to the

person

later served

parked a vehicle in the apartment complex patrking area and walked
toward the stairway to Pizzello's
Holland, the

same person

apartment.

Upon

seeing Mr.

returned to the parking area and drove

away in the vehicle in which

he had
2

arrived, not

returning for

approximately one hour, after which he passed through the parking
area and exited three times within
returning and parking.

a short

span of

time before

(R. 68-72, Addendum E hereto, Uf 6, 7, 8,

9-)
(b)
the vehicle
identified

After the

person had

returned yet

again, parked

in which he was driving, and gone into the apartment
as

Pizzello's,

announced his

status as

Mr.

Holland

knocked

on

the door,

an officer of the court and that he was

attempting to serve a summons and

complaint upon

Holland

the door for approximately ten

yelled

and

knocked

on

Pizzello.

Mr.

minutes, making a commotion loud enough to disturb the neighbors,
but received

no response.

(R. 68-72, Addendum E hereto, HH 12,

13, 14, 15.)
(c)
to

respond

After the person inside
to

then announced
court, that

Mr.
in a

the apartment

Holland's knocking and yelling, Mr. Holland
loud voice

service of

that he

the summons

thereof

outside

copies of the Summons
apartment door,

and

the

was an

door.

Complaint

specifically observing

minutes

thereafter,

whom he had earlier
the apartment,

Mr.

Mr. Holland left
in

front

of the

area.

Within less than

Holland observed the same person

observed entering

bend down

was leaving

that there were no other

documents or other paraphernalia in the
five

which he had

Mr. Holland

apartment

Amended

officer of the

and complaint

brought had been accomplished, and that
copies

had failed

and pick

the apartment,

up something,

same vehicle in which he had arrived and drive away.
Addendum E hereto, flf 16, 17, 18, 19 [1].)

3

exit from

return to the
(R. 68-72,

(d)
returned

to

Mr.
the

previously left

Holland
doorway

then
of

waited

the

several

apartment

minutes

at

which

and

he had

copies of the Summons and Amended Complaint, and

verified that they were no longer

there.

No other

persons had

passed in front of the apartment doorway in the interim.

(R. 68-

72, Addendum E hereto, % 19 [2].)
(e)
person whom

Mr. Holland

identified,

from

a

photograph, the

he had served as the defendant Pizzello.

(R. 68-72,

Addendum E hereto, U 22.)
(f)

The person whom Mr. Holland had

served had parked

the vehicle which he was driving in a space correlated by written
description with Pizzello 1 s apartment.

(R.

68-72,

Addendum E

hereto, fl 10.)
(g)

The vehicle

driven by the person whom Mr. Holland

had served was later identified as

registered to

Pizzello.

(R.

68-72, Addendum E hereto, % 20.)
2.

Pizzello

has

statement or other evidence

placed
that he

on

the

was not

record
in fact

no

sworn

placed in

possession of copies of the Summons and Amended Complaint in this
action.
3.

Default judgment in favor

entered pursuant

to hearing

of

the

plaintiffs was

on September 20, 1988.

In order to

appear at the hearing, it was necessary that the plaintiffs drive
to Salt

Lake City

from Las

Vegas, Nevada.

53.)

4

(R. 39, 40-41, 51,

4.

In

seeking

to

plaintiffs1 favor set aside,
responded

because

have

the default judgment in the

Pizzello

"defendant

did

argued

that

he

had not

feel

that

he

had any

not

responsibility with regards to the accident" (R. 45) and that "he
felt he had no responsibility" (R. 63).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The

determination

default judgment is within
court, and

may be

clearly shown.

the

set aside

There

of

whether

broad

only if

is nothing

to

set

discretion

of

aside

a

the trial

an abuse of discretion is

on the

record to

indicate an

abuse of discretion by the trial court.
2.
been properly
record, and

The

trial

served

was

court's
based

conclusion
on

that Pizzello had

credible

evidence

on the

no contrary evidence was submitted by Pizzello.

The

decision whether or not to believe the plaintiffs' evidence was a
decision to
courts.

be made by the trial court rather than the appellate

The factual findings of

the

trial

court

may

only be

disturbed if they are clearly against the weight of the evidence.
The trial court having

found that

Pizzello was

served, and its

finding having been based on uncontroverted evidence, its finding
may not be reversed on appeal.
3.

In the District Court, Pizzello sought to have the

default judgment
neglect.

against him

set aside on a theory of excusable

In order to show excusable neglect, a defendant seeking

relief from

a default judgment must show both (i) that he or she

exercised due diligence, and

(ii) that
5

he or

she was prevented

from

appearing

control.

by

circumstances

Pizzello's argument

over

that he

which

he or she had no

believed that

he did not

need to respond to the complaint in this action failed to satisfy
either requirement, is opposed to
unsupported by

Utah

case

any evidence on the record.

authority,

and is

Therefore, the trial

court's conclusion that Pizzello had not proven excusable neglect
was clearly within its broad discretion.
4.

No

basis

exists

for presuming that the District

Court ever reached the issue of whether or not Pizzello had shown
a meritorious

defense.

have been reached if
his excusable

The meritorious defense issue would only

Pizzello had

neglect.
exist

District

ruling

Pizzello's failure to
issue of

any

show

of whether

grounds

should

whether Pizzello

the issue

the court of

A ruling by the District Court is to be

affirmed if there
Court's

first persuaded

be

excusable

for

affirmance,

affirmed

on

neglect.

and the

the basis of
Therefore the

had shown

a meritorious defense, and

Pizzello could

constitutionally have been

required to make such a showing, need not be reached.
5.

Even if

it be

assumed arguendo that the District

Court reached the issue of whether
meritorious defense,

and decided

Court's ruling should be
interpreted
that a

by

the

meritorious

service was

that he

affirmed.

United
defense

never obtained.

in this instance, it

or not

Pizzello had

shown a

had not, the District

The due

process clause, as

States Supreme Court, only mandates
may

not

be

required

where valid

Because valid service was obtained

would have

been proper
6

to require

that a

meritorious defense be shown before the default judgment could be
set aside.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE DISTRICT COURT'S DETERMINATION NOT TO SET
ASIDE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT MAY NOT BE REVERSED
ON APPEAL UNLESS AN ABUSE OP DISCRETION HAS
BEEN CLEARLY SHOWN. THE DEPENDANT HAS SHOWN
NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THIS CASE.
The Utah Supreme Court
determination of
within the

whether to

broad discretion

judgment is

has

repeatedly

held

that the

set aside a default judgment is one
of the

trial court,

and a default

to be set aside by the appellate courts only when an

abuse of discretion is clearly shown.

Katz

92 (Utah

681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984);

1986); Russell

Gardiner and Gardiner
1982); Airkem

v. Martell,

Builders

v.

Swapp,

v. Pierce,

656

P.2d

732 P.2d

429 (Utah

Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513

P.2d 429 (1973); Masters v. LeSeuer, 13 Utah 2d 293, 373 P.2d 573
(1962); Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P.2d 741 (Utah 1953).
In Katz v. Pierce, supra, the Court said:
[B]efore we will interfere with the trial
court's exercise of discretion, abuse of that
discretion must be clearly shown. Russell v.
Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984).
That
some basis may exist to set aside the default
does not require the conclusion that the
court abused its discretion in refusing to do
so when facts and circumstances support the
refusal. Cf. Wilson v. Miller, 198 Kan. 321,
424 P.2d 271, 273 (1967).
Id. at 93, citations in original.

In Russell v.

cited in the foregoing, the Court said:

7

Martell, supra,

Broad discretion is accorded the trial
court in ruling on relief from a judgment;
and, this Court will reverse that ruling only
if it is clear the trial court abused its
discretion*
Id, at 1194.
The

decision

of

whether

or not to accept Pizzello1s

arguments was within the sound discretion of the trial court.

In

Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, supra, the Court stated the
standard of review as follows:
[T]his
court
will
not
reverse
the
determination of
the trial court merely
because the motion could have been granted.
Id* at 431.
within the

The determination

made by

the District

Court was

broad discretion normally given to the District Court

in this area.

Therefore,

the

District

Court's determination

should be upheld.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT VALID
SERVICE
WAS
OBTAINED
WAS
A
FACTUAL
DETERMINATION,
BASED
ON
CREDIBLE
AND
UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE, WHICH IS PROPERLY
WITHIN THE PROVINCE OP THE TRIAL COURT AND IS
THEREFORE NOT SUBJECT TO REVERSAL ON APPEAL.
Rule

4(i)

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure

provides:
Refusal
refuses
service
serving
process

of copy. If the person to be served
to accept a copy of the process,
shall be sufficient if the person
the same shall state the name of the
and offer to deliver a copy thereof.

Pizzello misstates the record in two important respects
in arguing that service was not valid under the quoted provision.
Pizzello incorrectly

states that "at no time was this individual
8

[the person

served] identified

Appellant, page 21).
plaintiffs1

process

To

as defendant Pizzello" (Brief of

the

server,

contrary,

the

driven by

the fact

that the

the individual served was registered to

Pizzello, and the correlation between the
the individual

of the

David T. Hoiland, demonstrates his

identification of Pizzello from a photograph,
motor vehicle

affidavit

served and

parking space

Pizzello's apartment.

used by

(Affidavit of

David T. Holland, R. 68-72, Addendum E hereto, UK 10, 20, 22.)
In addition, Pizzello incorrectly
is nothing

in the

,f

[t]here

record to suggest that the defendant Pizzello

refused to be served" (Brief of
contrary, the

states that

affidavit of

to come to the door and

Appellant,

page

21).

To the

Mr. Holland shows Pizzello's failure

accept service

of process

despite some

ten minutes of yelling and knocking by Mr. Holland. (Affidavit of
David T. Holland, R. 68-72, Addendum E hereto,
attempts

to

distinguish

U 14.)

Pizzello

between the affirmative verbal refusal

ruled upon in Wood v. Weenig, 736 P.2d 1053 (Utah App. 1987), and
his own

silence and

failure to answer the door.

no authority for the proposition that

silence or

Pizzello cites
inactivity may

not constitute a refusal.
It is

undisputed that

a person identified as Pizzello

entered the apartment before Mr. Holland
and did

not leave

attempted to

the apartment until afterward.

David T. Holland, R. 68-72, Addendum E hereto,
obvious inference,

serve him

(Affidavit of

HH 12,

19.)

The

which the District Court was free to draw, is

that Pizzello was inside his apartment at the time.

9

The District

Court was

also free

to find

a refusal in Pizzello's failure to

come to the door despite a commotion loud
neighbors.

disturb the

(Affidavit of David T. Holland, R. 68-72, Addendum E

hereto, 1 14.)
an obvious

enough to

If the District Court were not free to

draw such

conclusion, but were only permitted to find a refusal

when the refusal was verbally stated, then the "degrading game of
wiles and tricks'1 referred to with disapproval in Wood v. Weenig,
supra, at 1055,

could

be

carried

to

new

extremes

simply by

maintaining silence.
Finally, there

is no

basis in

the record to conclude

that copies of the Summons and Amended Complaint were not in fact
placed in

Pizzello's possession.

According to the affidavit of

Mr. Holland, Pizzello opened the door within a
copies

of

the

Summons

and

Amended Complaint had been left in

front of his door (no other documents or
the area),

picked up

and drove away.
he had
other

(Affidavit of
17, 19,
Court

no longer

had

free

evidence placed

to

studied it, went to his car
copies which

in

front

of

Pizzello's

doorway.

Holland, R. 68-72, Addendum E hereto, If

The

obvious inference,

draw

on the

been in

on Pizzello's doorstep, although no

passed

David T.

19 [sic].)

was

something and

objects having

Mr. Holland then verified that the

left were
persons

few minutes after

and

which the District

which is not contradicted by any

record, is

that Pizzello

picked up the

copies of the Summons and Amended Complaint which had been placed
on his doorstep and took them

with him.

Service

was therefore

complete under Rule 4(e)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides for personal service:

10

Upon a natural person of the age of 14 years
or over, by delivering a copy thereof to him
personally*..
Pizzello

filed

received copies of the
Pizzello argued

no

affidavit

Summons and

in the

saying

that he had not

Amended Complaint.

Indeed,

District Court that he had not responded

because "defendant did not

feel that

he had

any responsibility

with regards to the accident" (R. 45) and that "he felt he had no
responsibility" (R. 63), theories
occasion

to

possession

reflect
of

copies

upon

if

of

the

which he
he

had

Summons

would only

have had

in

fact been placed in

and

Amended Complaint.

However, Pizzello nonetheless seeks to have this Court rule, as a
matter of law, that service did not occur.
The determination of disputed facts is
the trial

court and not the appellate courts.

27 Utah 2d 39, 492 P.2d 1343 (1972).

the province of

Taylor v. Turner,

The factual findings of the

trial court may only be disturbed if they are clearly against the
weight

of

the

evidence.

Intermountain Stock

Ute-Cal

Exchange, 628

Land

P.2d 1278

Turner, 25 Utah 2d 351, 482 P.2d 117 (1971).
found

the

uncontroverted

District

Court's

v.

(1981); Farrell v.
The District Court

affidavit submitted by the plaintiffs

credible, and drew the obvious inferences
the

Development

factual

finding

therefrom.
that

served may not properly be reversed on appeal.

11

Therefore,

Pizzello had been

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT1S DETERMINATION THAT THE
DEFENDANT HAD
NOT DEMONSTRATED EXCUSABLE
NEGLECT WAS PROPERLY WITHIN THE DISCRETION OP
THE TRIAL COURT AND IS THEREFORE NOT SUBJECT
TO REVERSAL ON APPEAL.
Pizzello relies upon Rule 60(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure,

which

discretion,

to

"mistake,

permits
set

the

aside

inadvertance,

District

a

default

surprise,

Court,

judgment
or

within
on

its

grounds of

excusable

neglect".

Pizzello argued before the District Court that "defendant did not
feel that he had any responsibility" (R. 45) and that "he felt he
had

no

responsibility"

(R.

63). Pizzello's argument was very

similar to that rejected by the Court in Russell v.
P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984).

In Russell, one of the defendants, Mills,

had failed to answer the
obligation to

complaint

[the plaintiff]

because

he

"felt

no legal

and did not feel motivated by the

lawsuit to address [the plaintiff's] claims."
affirming the

Martell, 681

District Court's

Id. at

1194.

In

refusal to set aside the default

judgment entered against Mills, the Utah Supreme Court said:
[H]is undenied statements that he felt no
legal
obligation
to
respond
to
the
plaintiffs' claims support the trial court's
denial of his motion.
Id. at 1195, emphasis added.
In

effect,

Pizzello

should have believed his
respond

in

this

matter

partner with the driver
plaintiff's vehicle.

argues

theory that
was

the District Court

his neglect

in failing to

excusable because he was merely a

of the
(Brief

that

vehicle which

of Appellant,
12

collided with the
page 11.)

However,

the decision

of whether

or not

to accept Pizzello's theory was

within the sound discretion of the trial court.
732 P.2d

Katz

v. Pierce,

92 (Utah 1986); Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah

1984); Gardiner and Gardiner

Builders

v.

Swapp,

656

P.2d 429

(Utah 1982); Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65,
513 P.2d 429 (1973); Masters v. LeSeuer, 13 Utah 2d 293, 373 P.2d
573 (1962); Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P.2d 741 (Utah 1953).
In

order

to

demonstrate

that his or her neglect was

excusable, a defendant seeking to have
make two

separate showings.

a default

set aside must

As stated by the Utah Supreme Court

in Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, supra:
The movant must show that he has used due
diligence and that he was prevented from
appearing by circumstances over which he had
no control.
Id. at
that

431, emphasis changed.
indicate

attempting to

any

diligence,

determine the

belief that he was

Pizzello has not stated any facts
or

any

efforts

whatsoever, in

correctness or incorrectness of his

not required

to respond.

Moreover,

he has

cited no "circumstances over which he had no control" which might
have prevented him from answering the Amended Complaint.
In addition,
the

hardship

and

the District

prejudice

Court was

free to consider

to the plaintiffs which would have

resulted from setting aside the default judgment in
Katz

v.

Pierce,

supra;

Airkem

their favor.

Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker,

supra; Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., supra.

The plaintiffs had gone

to considerable time and expense in driving to Salt Lake City for
the hearing on the default judgment which took place on September
20, 1988.
13

In

Airkero

Intermountain,

Court said the following
broad discretion

with

Inc.

respect

v. Parker, supra, the

to

the

Distict Court's

in ruling on the defendant's claim of excusable

neglect:
[T]his
court
will
not
reverse
the
determination of
the trial court merely
because the motion could have been granted.
Id. at 431.

In the present case,

the determination

made by the

District Court was clearly well within its broad discretion.
POINT IV
THE
CONSTITUTIONAL
ISSUE RAISED BY THE
DEFENDANT NEED NOT BE REACHED, BECAUSE THERE
IS NO INDICATION THAT THE DISTRICT COURT
REACHED THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR
NOT A
MERITORIOUS DEFENSE
HAD BEEN SHOWN, AND
BECAUSE THERE ARE
SEPARATE
GROUNDS FOR
AFFIRMANCE.
In

an

apparent

concession

meritorious defense, Pizzello argues

that
that

he

has not shown a

the

District Court's

ruling was a denial of due process because it allegedly was based
on a requirement that Pizzello show a meritorious
the

default

judgment

constitutional argument
having argued
meritorious.
was not

be

for

the

set aside.
first

Pizzello makes his

time

on

appeal, after

in the District Court that his defense was in fact
An issue raised for the first time on appeal, which

raised before

on appeal.

could

defense before

the trial court, should not be considered

Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d

855 (Utah

1979); Nelson v.

Newman, 583 P.2d 601 (Utah 1978).
Pizzello
requirement of

a

disputes
meritorious

the

constitutionality

defense
14

as

stated

by

of

the

the Utah

Supreme

Court

in

State

By

Services v. Musselman, 667
making his

and

Through

P.2d 1053

argument Pizzello

Department of Social

(Utah 1983).

necessarily glosses

However/ in
over the fact

that there is nothing in the record to indicate that the District
Court

in

the

did

base

requirement of a meritorious defense.

In

Supreme Court

present

action

its

ruling

Musselman#

on

the

the Utah

stated the sequence to be followed by the District

Court:
[T]he policy in this jurisdiction requir[es]
that the lower court consider and resolve the
question of excusable neglect
(when the
motion to vacate the default judgment is
based on excusable neglect) prior to its
consideration of the issue of whether a
meritorious defense exists.
Id. at 1056f emphasis added.
In the present case,
whether

a

meritorious

defense

reached if excusable neglect
Pizzello states

as

in

Musselman,

existed

had already

would

the

issue of

only

have been

been shown.

Although

that he argued that there was excusable neglect,

and that he argued that valid

service

was

not

made

(Brief of

Appellant, pages 12-13), Pizzello has cited nothing in the record
to indicate that the
his arguments,

District Court

and nothing

in the

was persuaded
record to

indicate that the

District Court even reached the issue of whether
had shown

a meritorious defense.

is to be affirmed if
Global Recreation,

there
Inc. v.

exist

by either of

or not Pizzello

A ruling by the District Court
any

grounds

for affirmance.

Cedar Hills Development Company, 614

P.2d 155 (Utah 1980); Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610
15

P.2d 326 (Utah

1980); Allphin

Realty, Inc.

v. Sine,

595 P.2d 860 (Utah 1979);

Goodsel v. Department of Business Regulation, 523 P.2d 1230 (Utah
1974).

Pizzello's

failure

improper or his neglect
III)

provides

to

demonstrate

excusable

adequate

grounds

(discussed
for

that

service was

supra,

Points I-

refusing to set aside the

District Court's ruling.
POINT V
A REQUIRMENT THAT A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE BE
SHOWN WOULD NOT VIOLATE THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS BECAUSE VALID SERVICE OF THE
SUMMONS
AND
AMENDED COMPLAINT HAD BEEN
OBTAINED.
As
District
whether

discussed

Court
or

may

not

However, even

supra

be

affirmed

Pizzello

if it

(Point

IV), the

ruling

of the

without reaching the issue of

demonstrated

a

meritorious defense.

be assumed arguendo that it is necessary to

reach the issue of whether or not a

meritorious defense existed,

Pizzello1s constitutional argument must fail.
Pizzello argues

that the

meritorious defense, as set forth
Supreme

Court

Services v.
supra,

in

State

Musselman,

constitutes

an

By
667

and

requirment of a showing of a
in

the

opinion

Through

P.2d

1053

the Utah

Department of Social

(Utah

unconstitutional

of

1983), discussed

denial of due process.

Pizzello relies on the opinion of Judge J. Thomas Greene

in Gary

Facio v. The Hon. Maurice Jones and Collection Management Agency,
Inc., No. 88-C-965G (D.
Peralta

v.

Heights

L.Ed.2d 75 (1988).

Utah 1989),

Medical

which in

Center,

The critical

present in this case, was that:
16

Inc.,

fact in

turn is
108

based on

S.Ct. 896, 99

Peralta, which

is not

Citation issued, the return showing personal,
but untimely, service.
Id. at 897, emphasis added.

As the Court further elaborated:

Here, we assume that the judgment against him
[Peralta]
and
the
ensuing consequences
occurred without notice to appellant, notice
at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner that
would
have
given
him an
opportunity to be heard.
Id. at

899.

It is

clear that

the Court's

arose from the fact that Peralta had never
and

therefore

never

had

violation of due process
showing

of

a

proper

meritorious

been properly served,

notice.

where the

holding in Peralta

The

Texas courts

defense

Court found a
had required a

in addition to a showing of

improper service.
In
service had

Musselman,

by

been proper.

entered against

him was

contrast,

it

was

undisputed that

The defendant's attack on the default
based solely

on a

theory of excusable

neglect, and the Court held that if excusable neglect were shown,
a

meritorious

defense

would

need

to

be

shown

in addition.

Musselman and Peralta may be reconciled by stating the rule to be
that where service is improper or notice has not been
defendant may

not be

separately required

defense, but where the defendant
aside on

the basis

of his

seeks

to

own excusable

given, the

to show a meritorious
have

a

default set

neglect, he must also

demonstrate a meritorious defense.
The reasons for the

distinction

are

obvious.

Where

service has not occurred a default judgment is required to be set
aside because the judgment has been entered without jurisdiction,
17

whereas the

setting aside

of a default judgment on the basis of

excusable neglect is within the
court,

which

has

jurisdiction•

notice was given the
prevented by
respond

broad

error was

discretion

of

the trial

Moreover, where no service or
one which

could only

have been

the plaintiff, but where the defendant's failure to

arose

from

excusable, was

excusable

that of

neglect,

the

fault,

although

the defendant and beyond the plaintiff's

control.
The present case clearly falls under Musselman and not
Peralta.

The fact of proper service was accepted by the District

Court (discussed supra, Point II), which
affidavit of

apparently believed the

the plaintiffs' process server*

Therefore, even if

the District Court had found Pizzello's neglect to
it

could

have

properly

required,

in

be excusable,

addition,

a showing by

Pizzello that he had a meritorious defense.
CONCLUSION
The
affidavit of

District

Court

the plaintiffs'

determined,

based

process server,

on

the sworn

that Pizzello had

been validly served with the Summons and Amended

Complaint.

District Court

based its

factual determination

on credible and

uncontroverted

evidence,

which

Pizzello's deliberate

showed

valid

service

attempts to avoid service.

The

despite

Therefore, the

District Court's determination should be upheld on appeal.
Valid service having been
the

determination

judgment within

of

whether

the broad

or

obtained, Rule
not

discretion of
18

to

60(b) places

set aside a default

the trial

court.

The

defendant

having

failed

theory of excusable

to

neglect,

persuade the District Court of his
the

discretionary

ruling

of the

District Court should be affirmed.
The

defendant

defense was not shown.
he makes

However,

concedes that a meritorious

the due

process argument which

instead for the first time on appeal has no application

to this case.
affirmed

apparently

The

without

defendant

has

requirement

any

shown

of

violation of

District

a

due

Court's

ruling

determination
a

of

meritorious

meritorious
process

whether

defense.

defense

where

may

properly be
or

not

the

Moreover,

a

is only prohibited as a

proper

service

has

not been

obtained.
The District

Court was within its province in choosing

to believe the plaintiffs'
his affidavit

process server/

was uncontroverted.

determinations based on credible
range

of

discretion.

requests that this Court

The

particularly because

District Court made its

evidence and

within its proper

Accordingly, the plaintiff respectfully
affirm the

District Court's

denial of

the defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment.
RESPECTFULLY

Qcd^M^

SUBMITTED

this

2St£

day

1989.
ANDERSON & HOLLAND

Plaintiffs/Respondents
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of

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I
&£CiH^^

hereby

certify

that

on

this

ZJctsj

i 1989, four (4) true and correct copies

foregoing Brief of Respondent were hand-delivered to:
Joseph J. Joyce
STRONG & HANNI
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 841
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day

of

of the
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J. KENT HOLLAND, #1520
ANDERSON & HOLLAND
623 East First South
P.O. Box 11643
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0643
Telephone: (801) 363-9345

MAR 2 1 1989
/

SALTLAKE^OUNTY

By «/ft V *£. '

Dcpiay Cte«*

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GILLESPIE, JERRY
O R D E R
Plaintiff,
Civil No.

vs.

C87-4401

GEURTS, DALE W.
Defendant.
THE
Motion

to

COURT

Judge Scott Daniels

having

received Defendant

Set Aside Default

Judgment,

John

having

memoranda and Affidavits filed by the parties,
the

pleadings

and papers of record,

P.

Pizzello's

considered

the

having considered

and otherwise being

fully

advised in the premises;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED:
1.

That

Judgment be denied.

. ~,

DATED this Q\

Defendant's

Motion

to

Set

Aside

Default

AawL.
day of Eebaftrary, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

Judge Scott Daniels
Third Circuit Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I the undersigned do hereby certify thcit on the ^ffi^ day of
February,

1989 I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing

ORDER, postage prepaid to the following:
Joseph J. Joyce
STRONG & HANNI
Sixth Floor Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

<U£

code:gillordr^

ADDENDUM B

Rule 4

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 4. Process.
(a) Issuance of summons. The summons may be signed and issued by the
plaintiff or his attorney. A summons shall be deemed to have issued when
placed in the hands of a qualified person for the purpose of service. Separate
summonses may be issued and served.
(b) Time of issuance and service. If an action is commenced by the filing
of a complaint, summons must issue thereon within three months from the
date of such filing. The summons must be served within one year after the
filing of the complaint or the action will be deemed dismissed, provided that in
any action brought against two or more defendants in which personal service
has been obtained upon one of them within the year, the other or others may
be served or appear at any time before triaL
(c) Contents of summons* The summons shall contain the name of the
court, the names or designations of the parties to the action, the county in
which it is brought, be directed to the defendant, state the time within which
the defendant is required to answer the complaint in writing, and shall notify
him that in case of his failure to do so, judgment by default will be rendered
against him. If the summons be served without a copy of the complaint, or by
publication, it shall briefly state the sum of money or other relief demanded,
and in case of publication of summons such summons as published shall contain a description of the subject matter or res involved in the action. Where
the summons is served without a complaint, it shall note therein that a copy of
said complaint will be served upon or mailed to defendant within ten days
after such service or that if the address of defendant is unknown, the complaint will be filed with the clerk of the court within ten days after such
service.
(d) By whom served. The summons, and a copy of the complaint, if any,
may be served:
(1) Within the state, by the sheriff of the county where the service is
made, or by his deputy, or by any other person over the age of 21 years,
and not a party to the action; provided, that this rule shall not abrogate
the provisions of chapter 28, Laws of Utah, 1945.
(2) In another state or United States territory by the sheriff of the
county where the service is made, or by his deputy, or by a United States
marshal or his deputy.
(3) In a foreign country, either
(A) in the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country; or
(B) upon an individual, by delivery to him personally, and upon a
corporation or partnership or association, by delivery to an officer, a
managing or general agent; or
(C) by any form of mail, requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed
and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the party to be served; or
(D) as directed by order of the court
Service under (B) or (D) above may be made by any person who is not a
party and is not less than 21 years of age or who is designated by order of
the court
(e) Personal service in state. Personal service within the state shall be as
follows:
(1) Upon a natural person of the age of 14 years or over, by delivering a
copy thereof to him personally, or by leaving such copy at his usual place

6

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 4

of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion there residing; or
by delivering a copy to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to
receive service of process.
~ (2) Upon a natural person under the age of 14 years, by delivering a
copy thereof to such person and also to his father, mother or guardian; or,
if none can be found within the state, then to any person having the care
and control of such minor, or with whom he resides, or in whose service he
is employed.
(3) Upon a natural person judicially declared to be of unsound mind or
incapable of conducting his own affairs, by delivering a copy thereof to his
legal guardian.
(4) Upon any corporation, not herein otherwise provided for, upon a
partnership or other unincorporated association which is subject to suit
under a common name, by delivering a copy thereof to an officer, a managing or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment
or by law to receive serv&e of process and, if the agent is one authorized
by statute to receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a
copy to the defendant. If no such officer or agent can be found in the
county in which the action is brought, then upon any such officer or
agent, or any clerk, cashier, managing agent, chief clerk, or other agent
having the management, direction or control of any property of such
corporation, partnership or other unincorporated association within the
state. If no such officer or agent can be found in the state, and the defendant has, or advertises or holds itself out as having, an office or place of
business in this state, or does business in this state, then upon the person
doing such business or in charge of such office or place of business.
(5) Upon an incorporated city, by delivering a copy thereof to the
mayor or recorder; upon an incorporated town, by delivering a copy
thereof to the president or clerk of the board of trustees.
(6) Upon a county; by delivering a copy thereof to a county commissioner or to the county clerk of such countyD
(7) Upon a school district or board of education, by delivering a copy
thereof to the president or clerk of the board.
(8) Upon an irrigation or drainage district, by delivering a copy to the
president or secretary of its board.
(9) Upon the state of Utah, in such cases as by law are authorized to be
brought against the state, by delivering a copy thereof to the attorney
general.
(10) Upon a natural person, nonresident of the state of Utah, doing
business in this state at one or more places of business, as set forth in
Rule 17(e), by delivering a copy thereof to the defendant personally or to
one of his managers, superintendents or agents.
(11) Upon a department or agency of this state, or upon any public
board, commission or body, subject to suit, by delivering a copy thereof to
any member of its governing board, or to its executive employee or secretary.
(12) Upon an individual incarcerated or committed at a facility operated by the State or any of its political subdivisions, by delivering a copy
to the person who has the care, custody or control of the individual to be
served, or to that person's designee or to the guardian or conservator of
7
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the individual to be served if one has been appointed, who shall, in any
case, promptly deliver the process to the individual served.
(f) Other service.
(1) Service by publication. Where the person upon whom service is
sought resides outside of the state, or has departed from the state, or
cannot after due diligence be found within the state, or conceals himself
to avoid the service of process, or where such party is a corporation having no officer or other agent upon whom process can be served within this
state, or where in an action in rem some or all of the defendants are
unknown, service of process may be made by publication, as follows:
The party desiring service of process by publication shall file a motion
verified by the oath of such party or of someone in his behalf for an order
of publication. It shall state the facts authorizing such service and shall
show the efforts that have been made to obtain personal service within
this state, and shall give the address, or last known address, of each
person to be served or shall state that the same is unknown. The court
shall hear the motion ex parte and, if satisfied that due diligence has been
used to obtain personal service within this state, or that efforts to obtain
the same would have been of no avail, shall order publication of the
summons in a newspaper having general circulation in the county in
which the action is pending. Such publication shall be made at least once
a week for four successive weeks. Within ten days after the order is
entered, the clerk shall mail a copy of the summons and complaint to each
person whose address has been stated in the motion. Service shall be
complete on the day of the last publication.
(2) Alternative to service by publication. In circumstances described in (1) above justifying service of summons by publication, if the
party desiring service of summons shall file a verified petition stating the
facts from which the court determines that service by mail is just as likely
to give actual notice as service by publication, the court may order that
service of summons shall be given by the clerk mailing a copy of the
summons and complaint to the party to be served at his address, or his
last known address. Service shall be complete ten days after such mailing.
(3) Service outside of state. Personal service of a copy of the summons and complaint outside of this state is equivalent to service by publication and deposit in the post office, and shall be complete on the day of
such service.
(g) Manner of proof. Within five days after service of process, proof
thereof shall be made as follows:
(1) if served by a sheriff or United States marshal, or a deputy of either, by his certificate with a statement as to the date, place, and manner
of service.
(2) if by any other person, by his affidavit thereof, with the same statement
(3) if by publication by the affidavit of the publisher or printer or his
foreman or principal clerk, showing the same and specifying the date of
the first and last publication; and an affidavit by the clerk of the court of
a deposit of a copy of the summons and complaint in the post office as
prescribed by Subdivision (0 of this rule, if such deposit shall have been
made.
8
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(4) by the written admission or waiver of service by the person to be
served, duly acknowledged, or otherwise proved..
(h) Amendment At any time in its discretion and upon such terms as it
deems just, the court may allow any process or proof of service thereof to be
amended, unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the
substantial rights of the party against whom the process issued.
Xi) Refusal of copy. If the person to be served refuses to accept a copy of
the process, service shall be sufficient if the person serving the same shall
state the name of the process and offer to deliver a copy thereof.
(j) Time of service to be endorsed on copy. At the time of service, the
person making such service shall endorse upon the copy of the summons left
for the person being served, the date upon which the same was served, and
shall sign his name thereto, and, if an officer, add his official title.
(k) Designation of newspaper for publication of notice. In any proceeding, where summons or other notice is required to be published, the court
shall, upon the request of the party applying for such publication, designate
the newspaper and authorize and direct that such publication shall be made
therein; provided, that the newspaper selected shall be a newspaper of general
circulation in the county where such publication is required to be made and
shall be published in the English language.
(1) Service of process by telegraph or telephone. A summons, writ,
order or other process in any civil action or proceeding, and all other papers
requiring service, may be transmitted by telegraph or telephone for service in
any place within this state, and the telegraphic or telephonic copy of such
process or paper so transmitted may be served or executed by the officer or
other person to whom it is sent for that purpose, and returned by him, if
return is required, in the same manner and with the same force and effect as
the original thereof; and the officer or person serving or executing the same
has the same authority, and is subject to the same liabilities as if the copy
were the original The process or paper, when a writ or order, must be filed in
the court from which it was issued, and a certified copy thereof must be
preserved in the telegraph or telephone office from which it was sent. The
operator sending the message may use either the original or a certified copy of
the process or paper. Whenever any document to be sent by telegraph or
telephone bears a seal, either private or official, it is not necessary for the
operator in sending the same to telegraph or telephone a description of the
seal, or any word or device thereon, but the same may be expressed in the
telegraphic or telephonic copy by the letters "L-S.," or by the word "Seal.*
(m) Service by constable* All writs and process, including executions
upon judgments, issued out of a district, city or justice court in a civil action or
proceeding may be served by any constable of the county.
(Amended, effective March 1, 1988.)
ing to §§ 10-2-110 and 10-3-106, the governing
body of an incorporated town consists of a
council and mayor.
Cross-References. — Collection agencies,
process server in actions by, § 12-1-8.
Condominium association or ownership, service of process on person designated in declaration, § 57-8-33.
Constable, servnce of process by, §§ 17-22-25,
17-25-1.

Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment added Subdivision (e)(12).
Compiler's Notes. — This rale generally
follows Rule 4, F.R.C.P.
Laws 1945, ch. 28, referred to in Subdivision
(dXD, appears as § 12-1-8, relating to actions
by collection agencies.
The reference, in Subdivision (e)(5), to the
"president or clerk of the board of trustees'* of
an incorporated town seems incorrect Accord-
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Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order,
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arisiAgfromoversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtheraxice of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3)fraud(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
Med to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons U)> (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is patterned to 3* aside judgment, §§ 78-3-16.5, 78-4-24,
after, and similar to, Hule 60,1.ILC.P.
78-MA; Appx. O, Code of 3uoidai AdimmstraCross-References. — Fee for filing motion tiei**
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„
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JERRY GILLESPIE dba JERRY'S
DRYWALL and PAMELA GILLESPIE,
S U M M O N S
Plaintiffs,
vs.
DALE W. GEURTS, JOHN P.
PIZZELLO, and SPRINKLERS, SOD
& SUCH,

CIVIL NO. C87-4401
JUDGE SCOTT DANIELS

Defendants.
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT JOHN P. PIZZELLO:
YOU ARE HEREBY summoned and required to file an Answer
in writing to the attached Amended Complaint with the Clerk of
the above-entitled Court, and to serve upon or mail to KENNETH
A. BRONSTON, Plaintiff's attorney, 623 East First South, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84102, a copy of said Answer, within twenty (20)
days after service upon you.
If you fail
against you for the
has been filed with
is hereto annexed and

so to do, Judgment by Default will be taken
relief demanded in said Complaint, which
the Clerk of said Court and a copy of which
herewith served upon you.

DATED this £_

day of April, 1988.

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
PLEASE SERVE:
JOHN P. PIZZELLO
6960 WELL SPRING ROAD
MIDVALE, UTAH 84047

sx

AFFIDAVIT CF SERVICE

iMU^

STATE 0 ?

COUNTY OF

S3 -

UtifalL/

fcULKWLJLs.

, beinc first dulv svcr

deposes *nd savs: That he/she ic a citizen cf the United States;
that he/she.is a resident of the State of
County of jhfJ/[^

1/^X^

r ""hat he/she if over the ace

Y^&MJL^

of 21 years and that he/she is not a party to the action; that
e*

th3

u or

? -

d3

>?

#/

of

^^E
oA^/P- Ptkru/Jf

copy .2 the annexec

, 1931, he/she served

/JAAJL

^AA^im^

, a full, tru* and correct

t

s (^

delivering to, and leaving with said

....' ~Y
Oj^J

P. QftsuJUr

,

the same copies attf£Qfo/^i^
th; c upon the said copy affiant endorsed, the date and place of
service and signed his/her name•

Date:

fffj/AtflW

K~6fTUfo~JL
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e - ne t h i s

-J I /yf

a

Nctdry Public
COEsission

'

cav

or

'

Expires K-'S-^D

Residing in Salt Lake City, Utah
Service Fee:: 5
Mileage//.( :
Notary Fee :! ?
Locate Fee :
TOTAL

7^P

AApy^—

ADDENDUM E

„^\tfM*6U8T
C^'.*l['* ^ y y n '

J. KENT HOLLAND, #1520
KENNETH A. BRONSTON, #4470
ANDERSON & HOLLAND
623 East First South
P.O. Box 11643
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0643
Telephone: (801) 363-9345

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTYyfcr
STATE OF UTAH
JERRY GILLESPIE dba JERRY'S
DRYWALL and PAMELA GILLESPIE,

A F F I D A V I T

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Civil No. C87-4401

DALE W. GEURTS, JOHN P.
PIZZELLO, and SPRINKLERS,
SOD & SUCH,
Defendants.
COMES

Judge Scott Daniels

NOW David T. Holland,

Affiant,

and deposes,

swears, and states under oath as follows:
1.
Amended

That

Affiant is the individual who served Summons and

Complaint upon Defendant John P. Pizzello in the above

captioned matter on April 21, 1988 and subsequently signed before
a

Notary

Affiant

the Affidavit of Service,
wrote

the reverse side

of which

a description of the manner of his service

upon

Defendant, John P. Pizzello.
2.

That

at the time

Defendant Pizzello,

Affiant

made

said

service

Affiant was employed full-time as a

upon

process

server.
3.
his

That

service

Affiant has a particularly clear recollection
of Summons and Amended

Complaint

Pizzello as fully set forth hereinbelow.

upon

of

Defendant

4.

That on April 21,

to 6960 Wellspring Road,

1988 Affiant drove in his automobile

an apartment complex,

pursuant to

the

direction of Plaintiffs' Attorney.
5.
left

Upon Affiant's arrival at the apartment complex, Affiant

his

level

car in a parking space and ascended steps to a

and

approached

apartment

number

5X

second

designated

by

Plaintiffs' attorney as that belonging to Defendant Pizzello.
6.
Amended

That in the process of attempting to serve Summons

and

Complaint at the door of Defendant Pizzello's apartment,

he observed an automobile being driven into the apartment complex
parking area, come to a stop, and a man exit from said automobile
and start to approach the stairway,
7.
Affiant

As

Defendant approached the stairway he looked

attempting to serve process,

Affiant

at

giving Affiant opportunity

to look directly into Defendant's face.
individual

up

Affiant felt that

immediately acted in a suspicious manner upon

said
seeing

by changing his apparent direction and returning to

his

automobile and driving away.
8.

Immediately

thereafter,

Affiant

returned

to

his

automobile, wherein he sat for approximately one hour.
9.

Toward

remained

in

referenced
proceed

the

end

of the period

his automobile,

hereinabove

Affiant

return

to

during

observed

the

which
the

apartment

Affiant

automobile

complex

through the parking areas and then exit and then

and

return

three times within a brief span of time.
10.
parking

Following
areas

automobile

the

automobile's last course

of the apartment complex,

being

parked

in

a

space

through

Affiant observed
correlated

by

the
said

written

description with Defendant Pizzello's apartment.
11.

It

was

raining at the time of the

events

described

herein,

and

to

better

towards

his apartment,

observe Defendant

Pizzello's

progress

Affiant exited his automobile to gain

a

better view.
12.
who

From his vantage point Affiant observed the individual

had

exited the automobile climb the stairs

to

the

second

level of the apartment complex and enter apartment number 5X.
13.

Immediately

apartment
and

which

thereafter,

Affiant

approached

the individual hereinabove referenced

attempted to serve Summons and Amended Complaint

the

entered,
upon

said

individual by Affiant's announcing Affiant's status as officer of
the

court

and that Affiant was offering to

serve

Summons

and

Amended Complaint upon Defendant Pizzello at that very moment.
14.
Amended
upon

it

several

That in aid of Affiant's attempt to serve
Complaint,
for

Affiant yelled through the door and

approximately

neighboring

Summons and

ten minutes with

apartment

lights

went

such
on

pounded

vigor

and

that

neighbors

appeared at their doorways questioning the commotion being made.
15•
Amended

That

throughout

Complaint,

his

attempt to

serve

no individual made his presence

Summons

and

known

from

within the apartment, nor did Affiant hear any sound from within.
16.
Amended

That following his futile efforts to place Summons and
Complaint

in

the hands of the

individual

within

the

apartment, Affiant announced again in a loud voice that he was an
officer
Complaint

of

the court,

that service of the Summons and

had been accomplished and that Affiant was

Amended

leaving

a

copy of Summons and Amended Complaint outside the apartment door.
17.

Affiant

left

a

copy

of

the

Summons

and

Amended

Complaint outside the apartment door and in so doing specifically
observed

that

there

were

no

other

paraphernalia outside the apartment door.

documents

or

other

18.

Thereafter,

maneuvered

it

into

Affiant
a

returned

to his automobile

position from which

he

could

and

observe,

without obstruction, the Defendant's apartment doorway.
19.

Within

less than five minutes of Affiant's return

to

his automobile, Affiant observed the same individual whom Affiant
had

earlier

apartment

observed and described hereinabove,

exit from

the

bend down and pick up something and briefly study

it.

Said individual then returned to the same vehicle in which he had
arrived and drove away.
19.

Affiant waited several minutes and then returned to the

apartment

at

discovered

which

he

had attempted service

of

process

that the Summons and Amended Complaint were

and

missing.

From the time Affiant left process at the doorway until Affiant's
discovery that process was missing,
observe,

Affiant was in a position to

and did so in fact note, that no persons passsed by the

doorway in question.
20.
Utah

Subsequently,

State

Affiant personally made inquiry at

Department of Motor Vehicles wherein

he

the

discovered

that the vehicle driven by the individual who had refused service
of

process as hereinabove described was registered to

Defendant

Pizzello.
21.
movements

That

in

Affiant's

are

described

opinion,

the

hereinabove,

individual

whose

intentionally

and

deliberately refused service of process upon him.
22.
Defendant's
Defendant

That

Affiant

Utah
and

is

driver's
positive

has

examined

license,
that

the

a

verified

including
photograph

copy

photograph
depicts

of
of
the

individual he served process upon on April 21, 1988 as herein set
forth.

FURTHER Affiant sayeth naught.

DAVID T. HOLLAND
Affiant

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

:ss

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this =J/-^ day of January,
1989.

/Li/a ^"^"fa
7r~

Notary Public

1
I
I
- ^ S C

Stele
Utah
Stat9of
0 fUtah

I

— •*"— — — «u ^. J

code:hollaff

